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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Making well-informed decisions about how best to achieve MDGs depends on the ability of public 
policy makers in accessing the best available evidence about what is known to work and what could be 
potential benefits, and ways to integrate solutions into complex and often under-resourced health 
systems. Conditional cash transfer programmes have been largely explored as a policy for improving the 
education and health outcomes of poor children in developing countries as well as a tool for long-term 
poverty alleviation; but needs to be appropriate to the context and both fiscally and politically 
affordable. In DRC, the crisis and conflicts of the past decades severely affected the health status of the 
population and degraded the health system. Consequently, efforts in reducing infant and under-five 
morbidity and mortality are seriously hampered by widespread poverty and economic deregulation.  
 
The aim of this paper is to question the feasibility and affordability of cash transfer compared to 2 
alternatives: an outreach health and nutrition programme with a behavioral change communication 
component and the elimination of basic health care user fees. The results show that children health 
outcomes may instead be driven by the equal distribution of quality services through outreach health and 
nutrition programmes (20% to real GDP) than a large scale health-oriented conditional cash transfer 
(25.9% to real GDP). A number of issues is outlined with regard to the country’s socio-economic and 
political context : (i) health-oriented conditional cash transfer cannot operate in DRC due to supply-side 
constraints and lack of health supply strategy, logistics and engineering ; (ii) targeting is somewhat time 
consuming and irrelevant in such context with a headcount averaging 77% ; (iii) outcomes of a 
geographic focused cash transfer programme could be expected on improvement of nutritional status, 
but less on the rise of health demand and would be difficult to scale-up. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The challenges relating to the realization of child rights in the DRC are enormous. According to the World Bank, 
over 70% of the population lives below the international poverty line of $1 per capita per day1. A recent study 
revealed that poverty is overwhelmingly affecting children more than adults and reports that nearly 77% of the 
children in the country live below the poverty line2. The national poverty line has been set back to $ 0.72 per 
person per day and the proportion of children living in poverty is still very high (56.6%). Despite the national 
economic growth estimated at 12% in 2008, the average income per capita remains as low as US$ 102.3 
 
Children are disproportionately represented among the income-poor and many suffer from severe deprivation. 
Also, the resources devoted to the social sector remain inadequate and do not fit in a long-term perspective despite 
the fact that the country adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2006) together with a four years 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (2007 – 2010). The DRC ranks 167 out of 177 on the Human 
Development Index (HDI).  The problematic and highly vulnerable position of children is further reflected in their 
lack of access to health services, quality education, and their exposure to physical and psychological violence. 
They are paying a heavy tribute as they are the most vulnerable to widespread poverty, deterioration in the quality 
of life, high unemployment, rising food prices, and grave inequity in access to basic social services. 
 
With a low State budget allocation to health care and the low demand from the population due to extreme poverty 
(both monetary and non monetary), the country continues to face major difficulties as the levels of morbidity and 
mortality remain high. It is not surprising that reducing infant and under-five (U5) mortality is seriously hampered 
under this condition. In the past six years, the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) declined, but by not more than 
4%4. Even though the recently completed Demographic Health Survey (DHS, 2007) confirms a new U5MR of 
148 out of 1,000 live births, the reduction of the mortality rate will not be enough for DRC to be on course for 
achieving the MDGs by 2015.  
 
These morbidity and mortality rates are exacerbated by the appearance of new challenges facing the health sector: 
(i) strong proliferation of HIV / AIDS whose prevalence is estimated at 5.5% in 2007 (DHS, 2007) and affects 
primarily the portion of the population living in poor conditions, (ii) resurgence of tuberculosis, which usually 
accompanies HIV/AIDS, (iii) persistence of malaria, which currently accounts for 40 to 50% of consultations and 
28% of hospitalizations, (iv) low coverage of obstetric care, marked by increased maternal and neonatal 
mortalities. These situations are likely to increase the risk of mortality, especially among children and women 
with low nutritional status. On the other hand, the population’s inaccessibility to basic health care services affects 
both social and economic activities by reducing their performance and ability to work. This leads to an economic 
loss of the potential labor force, both in terms of gross volume and productivity and, consequently, economic 
growth as it has been clearly demonstrated by Sen (1995) in his human capital theory. 
 
In the recent years, a number of strategies have been explored in order to enhance human capital accumulation 
and impact household welfare in view of breaking intergenerational transmission of poverty. An illustration of 
this is the approach of social risk management advocated by the World Bank (social contracts) including direct 
cash transfers and approaches seeking complementarities between public (social security) and community systems 
(palliative systems), health insurance and health mutuals.  This paper attempts to analyze the potential impact of a 
child-focused cash transfer programme with a health-oriented conditionality in reducing physical vulnerability 
(with a focus on child malnutrition) among the under-five to meet 2 objectives: (i) one that directly offsets the 
income effect of the shock through transfer of an amount of cash per child under-five in each household and ; (ii) 
one that seeks to mitigate the consequences of vulnerabilities on human development outcomes such as nutrition 
status of children. Our analysis therefore aims to answer 2 essential questions: (i) Is a universal or targeted cash 
transfer to reduce child morbidity and mortality fiscally and administratively affordable for the DRC given its 
actual macroeconomic context? (ii) Is a child-focused health-oriented universal cash transfer program the most 
                                                 
1
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3
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4
 UNICEF MICS 2001, UNICEF SOWC 2008 
 3 
appropriate and cost-effective way to meet universal access to basic health care especially in this post-conflict 
situation?  
 
 
2. Problem identification: Child and Infant Morbidity and Mortality 
 
Graph 1: Underweight distribution by province (DHS, 2007) The crisis and conflicts of the past decades 
severely affected the health status of the 
population of DRC, especially in such fragile 
environment conducive to health system 
degradation. As a result, the overall coverage 
of the basic health services along with the 
utilization of these services were highly 
affected.  
 
The main health sector-related MDG 
indicators remain very poor although there 
have been some improvements since the end 
of major conflicts, but the Country is still 
struggling to reach the pre-1990 levels. 
Under-five mortality during the period 2002-
2006 is estimated from the 2007 
Demographic and Health Survey at 148 per 
1,000 live births (figure 3), among the highest 
in the African region.  
 
Data from DHS survey indicate some improvement over the past few years. The estimate for the period 1998-
2001 is 165 per 1,000 live births, against 172 in 1993-97. However, most of the improvement is concentrated 
among ages 1-4 years, likely reflecting better care since the end of the civil war, while infant mortality, thought 
more sensitive to health care services, hardly changed. At the same time, chronic malnutrition among under-five 
children estimated at 31.1 % in 2007 (figure 2) may have increased. Consistent with this very poor nutritional 
situation, 48% of children aged 6-59 months had moderate or severe anemia in 2007, while the prevalence was 
18% among women aged 15-49 years.  
 
Using underweight as a proxy for socio-economic conditions, figure 2 illustrates how the prevalence of 
malnutrition among children were dramatically deteriorated during the period of war as well as the increase in 
child and infant mortality (figure 3). The projections towards the 2015 MDGs horizon suggest that the country 
would not be able to achieve health-related MDGs and could only reach the pre-conflict figures5, far from the 
expected benchmarks (“halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living extreme poverty and 
hunger”). Even with such assumptions, the indicators hide disparities between poorest (1st quintile: Q1) and 
better-offs (5th quintile: Q5), and between rural and urban areas. These also lead to large differences in health 
outcomes between different socio-economic groups and areas. While 52% of children under-five in rural areas 
were chronically-malnourished (stunted) in 2007, prevalence was 36% in urban areas. Reflective of the very poor 
nutritional situation, 50% of children aged 6-59 months in rural areas had moderate or severe anemia in 2007, 
compared to 45% in urban areas.  
 
Malaria is also highly endemic and contributes a great deal to child morbidity and mortality. The disease is 
widespread and reported to account for over half of outpatient visits, one-third of hospital admissions, and 25-
30% of child mortality (UNICEF, 2008). Population-representative survey data have similarly shown that fever is 
associated with 40% of child deaths (IRC, 2004, cited by UNICEF, 2008). 
                                                 
5
 These figures represent the levels at which the country was before the outbreak of hostilities. Further efforts are therefore 
needed to reach the levels obtained during the commitments to the MDGs (1990) 
 
Equateur  29.2
Katanga  20.2
Kasai Occidental  30.3
Orientale  21.4
Bas Congo  25.6
Maniema  18.1
Sud Kivu  30.8
Nord Kivu  20
Bandundu  27.8
Kinshasa  14.8
Kasai Oriental  30.8
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Graph 2 : Trends in underweight among children aged 6-59 
months 
Graph 3 : Trends in child and infant mortality (children aged 6-
59 months) 
Trends in underweight
32.3
19,6
31.1
26
15
10
15
20
25
30
35
1990 2001 2007 2015
%
 d
o
f
 U
5
 
 
Trends in mortality among U5
213
220
185
148
66
50
100
150
200
250
1990 2001 2007 2015
U
5
 M
o
r
ta
li
ty
 r
a
te
 
Legend :  
Red  = Actual evolution of the indicator ;  
Green  = projection towards the MDGs horizon (2015) and ;  
Orange = Projection expected as per MDGs to the benchmark 
Sources: DHS 1990, MICS 2001, DHS 2007. 
 
Based on epidemiological evidences, the causal relationship between highest prevalence as stunting, iodine and 
iron deficiencies, and inadequate cognitive and social-emotional stimulation was determined (Grantham-
McGregor et al., 2007; Heckman et al., 2006; Berlinski et al., 2006). Also, it is a known fact that the course of 
infectious diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS is much more detrimental for undernourished than for other 
categories. Therefore, programmes that promote child development through preventing or improving child 
nutrition and health (in an overall morbidity reduction perspective) reduce the effects of social, environmental, 
and infectious risks of morbidity and mortality especially among the under-five. This leads, in a medium term, to 
consistent cognitive and socio-emotional outcomes and, in a long term to educational performance, employment 
improvement, and disruption of intergenerational cycle of poverty. 
 
 
4. Problem analysis 
 
4.1. Structural causes of child morbidity and mortality 
 
Though the deterioration of the key health indicators in the DRC comes from a conjectural situation, it is also fair 
to acknowledge that several structural factors stand to be the direct causes of child morbidity and mortality: (i) the 
country’s poor health policies, (ii) a multitude of supply constraints, (iii) the recent food crisis and, (iv) the loss by 
several households of their livelihood. 
 
After a long period of structural adjustment marked by “belt-tightening” measures combined with poor 
governance and disappearance of the Welfare State, the Government spending on social sectors failed to keep up 
with population growth and to adequately respond to increasing health needs and demands. Care has become less 
and less affordable for a growing number of people, especially for the poorest. Concurrently, the ideas of “cost-
sharing” and “community financing” (Bamako Initiative, 1987) adopted by the country and operationalised 
through formal and informal direct payments imposed on the users of public health care services (= user fees) 
have been detrimental to a large proportion of the population, especially for the poorest. However, to a large 
extent, these schemes have failed to meet expectations with respect to additional resource generation, 
improvement of quality of services and the predicted increase of health service utilization. On the contrary, a 
dramatic and sustained drop in the use of services was observed, given that non-creditworthy remained de facto 
excluded from the system. 
 
At the opposite of the strong health need and demand, the health services supply remain poor, especially in rural 
areas due to numerous disruptions, lower-than-projected production growth, and small inventories operating 
illegally. This situation has worsened considerably, leading the informal service providers to play a significant 
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role on household-level utilization of health services without any guarantee on their quality. The 2001 MICS 
found that more than 25% of children with fever received care from drug sellers. 
 
The estimated annual requirements to develop and support health services shown in the medium term expenditure 
framework are in the range of US$ 430 million in the period 2008-2010.  This is around US$ 6.50 per capita 
annually, a level of public spending on health care that would be consistent with a country with an annual GDP 
per capita of around US$ 200, but still in an unrealistic range.   
 
Regarding social protection scheme, DRC like most sub-Saharan African countries has no explicit policy with 
regard to national solidarity and redistribution of wealth. The vast majority of the population, estimated at 95% 
(ILO, 2001), has no social security coverage. The option taken by policymakers was to restrict the coverage to 
public sector employees under the labor code, registered and able to pay regular contributions. The informal 
sector, rural people, self employed and unemployed were excluded from the public system, which makes the need 
to strengthen social safety nets in assisting poor families to cope with declining income without sacrificing the 
expenses related to school and health care more than necessary.  
 
On another level, the social affairs sector has experienced a paltry budget, with a record of US $ 33 million in 
2008 (see figure 5), equivalent to US $ 0.6 per capita. On this line of public spending, nearly half (48%) is 
devoted to the central administration costs. Thus, the amount budgeted is not necessarily spent and, therefore, is 
likely to overestimate the social protection expenditure as % of GDP.  
 
A fact that deserves to be stressed is that conflicts have repeatedly led to spontaneous changes due to multiple 
displacements (DRC abounds more than half of IDPs in the sub-region), the loss of speed, vulnerability in a 
context of general insecurity. Households are therefore struggling daily to ensure their livelihood mainly based on 
small-scale agricultural activities and livestock. The continuing fragility of the ecosystem due to inadequate 
rainfall, the increase in food prices due to the dual financial and food crisis are all factors that explain the negative 
effects on food sovereignty with visible consequences on child nutrition and health.  
 
As a result, the living conditions of the poorest households are deteriorating, with an increase in the level of 
household indebtedness and a reduction in the quality and frequency of meals, thus increasing food insecurity and 
malnutrition.  For example, the price of imported rice in DRC in July 2008 was more than double its level a year 
earlier.  Similarly, cooking oil and fresh vegetables have increased by over 16 percent. This is greatly limiting 
accessibility to nutritious food for rural and urban households (especially those headed by women or children).  
These crises, if left unattended, have the potential to undo the progress of the last 10 years and put the Country 
right back at pre-1990 levels. Malnutrition is known to have long-term cognitive and productivity effects on the 
children involved and may generate cumulative economic costs, up to 3% of GDP annually. This outweighs any 
short-term fiscal savings from direct nutrition action to prevent malnutrition and promote adequate growth in 
young children. 
 
During the years 1990-2005, the proportion of people living below the poverty line rose from 80% in 2001 to 
70.8% in 2005 (Table 1; ref. PRSP, 2006); the influence of insufficient resources on access to health care has 
impacted on the lower level of child mortality. Given these factors, changes in the mortality of children under 5 
years can be explained by differences in access to care due to the situation of parents who are not remedied by 
programs addressing poverty and disparities. Furthermore, the probability for a child to die before his 5th birthday 
decrease as the educational level of mothers increases. Thus, infant mortality increased from 135 ‰ in children 
whose mothers have not studied at 67 ‰ in those whose mothers have reached the level of higher education. 
 
The largest part of GDP comes from agriculture (especially cash crops) and industry 31.3% and 29.7% in 1990, 
and 39.8% and 22.3% in 2005 respectively. The share of services remains close to 31%. This means in a long run 
that improving the situation of children does not automatically come from a change in the structure of the 
economy or increase in real income, but rather on fair social service offer.  
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3. Policies options to overcome child morbidity and mortality 
 
To identify the optimal option in terms of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness on the reduction of child morbidity 
and mortality, we considered 3 different approaches/alternatives which are in fact non exclusive : (i) a health-
oriented large scale cash transfer programme with a monthly growth monitoring for children under two (and a 
quarterly visit for those from 3 to 5) at a therapeutic feeding center, nutrition education for mothers, and the 
provision of vitamin A supplements and deworming; (ii) an outreach health and nutrition programme with a 
behavioral change communication component given the deterioration of the health system and the per capita 
allocation to health care (2% of the total government expenditure); (iii) the mobilization of resources from the 
government to support the elimination of basic health care  user fees. 
 
The first approach relies on a rights-based approach to emphasize not only the consequences of the program but 
also the process through which these are achieved with multiple objectives, namely: the alleviation of current 
poverty through targeted cash transfers, and the generation of a sustained decrease in poverty by conditioning 
these transfers on the accumulation of human capital (i.e. nutrition and health status) by households.  Two other 
approaches which have gained prominence over the last decade are the basic needs (Streeten et al., 1981) and 
capabilities approach (Sen, 1985; Sen, 1987). Both of these approaches distinguish between income as a "mean" 
or as an "end", and highlight the commonly observed lack of strong correlation between income and other 
outcomes that enter into one's concept of development.  
 
 
4. Methodology and data 
 
The objective is to determine whether potential health-oriented cash transfer program, targeted or universal, is 
economical and cost effective, taking into account the direct and administrative costs to implement such a 
programme. The costs of alternatives have been calculated based on public expenditure rather than budget 
allocations. As the cost-benefit analysis requires calculating the opportunity cost of spending an equivalent 
amount on other programs, the question is whether the marginal benefit of an additional dollar spent more 
effectively on a program of cash transfer compared to the marginal benefit of an extra dollar raised to the 
elimination of user fees in the health sector. We have chosen to make calculations based on quantitative 
techniques to measure the cost of a potential cash transfer programme and determine whether it is economical and 
cost-effective in order to reduce poverty and accumulate human capital.  
 
The data used in our calculations are those from the general population Census projections (1984), i.e. well before 
the conflicts started. High levels of mortality for the period 1990-2000, population displacement and various 
migrations make theses values unreliable. However, in the absence of recent and relevant data, the figures are in 
fact considered as being official. From a simulation based on informal sector and poverty survey (1-2-3), we 
estimated a US $ 10 per child per month for the least interesting scenario and US $ 15 per child per month for the 
better one, the direct costs of the transfer. Administrative costs have been difficult to determine because such 
programme in DRC should be multi-sectoral involving several administrations (as no administration has the 
formal institutional competency to deliver such a social programme alone). To simplify our calculations, an 
administrative cost of 12% of the delivering costs of the program would be reasonable, even if it seems high 
compared to other experiments in which these costs were approximately 5%. Because of poor governance and 
administrative malfunction, leakages will also be high (estimated at about 30%). 
  
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
5.1. Design and structure of transfers: size, conditionality and coverage 
 
Social transfers constitute subsidies in cash or kind to households or individuals for the purpose of 
supplementing their income or consumption. In this context, they are primarily an instrument for poverty and 
vulnerability reduction of the under-fives. Also, transfer sizes related to health and nutrition conditions are 
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generally lump sum. There have been a number of different approaches to the design of the transfer. In most 
cases, the amount of the health/nutrition transfer represents the difference between the consumption of an average 
extreme poor household and the food poverty line, with some variations (i.e., the per capita poverty gap for 
children under 6 only). The goal of this type of transfer is to – on average - move households living in indigence 
to a minimum consumption level. In addition to a basic needs and political issue, minimum consumption is seen 
as a pre-requisite to human capital investment. Another approach is to base the transfer amount on the opportunity 
costs of accessing health care, which has resulted in a lower average monthly transfer. For the purposes of the 
present paper, it is important to note that the health and nutrition grant lump sum structure favors smaller families. 
 
The determination of the size of the transfer is consistent with the country context marked by a significant 
increase in food prices and experiences in neighboring countries where the size of the transfer was averaging   
US$ 12 per child per month, although some countries have transferred more than US$ 25 per child per month as is 
the case in Lesotho and South Africa. Taking into account the government previsions in the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework for the year 2010 (which takes into account the level of growth and the inflation rate at 
its current level), the real GDP was estimated at US$ 12.2 billion. We opted for a transfer to cover the food basket 
for a child per month in urban areas (US$ 10) and with non foods (US$ 15). Declination to urban / rural was not 
deemed necessary in our analysis because the most relevant data were lacking. It is clear that a transfer of US$ 15 
per child per month would have more impact with positive externalities in terms of access to basic health care and 
basic education. 
 
In order to receive the month-to-month conditional cash transfer, beneficiary households must comply with a set 
of conditions related to the use of preventive health services and attendance to a monthly growth monitoring for 
children under two (and a quarterly visit for those from 3 to 5) at a therapeutic feeding center, nutrition education 
for mothers, and the provision of vitamin A supplements and deworming. This package of services will enable the 
country not only to cope with the challenging issues of child malnutrition, but also to contribute to the African 
strategy for child survival and development (SASDE), a strategy that the country is preparing to implement.  
 
The nutrition outcome is expected to result from the combination of the increased income from the transfers, the 
growth monitoring and the nutrition knowledge provided to caregivers. Since therapeutic feeding centers are not 
located in all health zones in the country, a pilot experience in areas where such centers could be used is needed, 
but the scaling-up of such programme will remain a major challenge. The behavior change communication 
strategy focuses on infant and young child feeding practices as recommended by WHO and UNICEF, disease 
preventive measures, home-based care, recognition of danger signs, and care seeking for sick children and 
incorporates not only mothers but also other influential caregivers such as grandmothers.  In addition, the 
management of acute malnutrition which includes the use therapeutic foods has to be strengthened in all the 
intervention areas.   
 
 
5.2. Universal or targeted programme? 
 
The issue of children in situations of vulnerability is a complex type in an environment such as the DRC. It is the 
consequence of a heterogeneous group of children whose common point is to live in an environment unfavorable 
to their socio-emotional development: street children, abused children, children separated from their parents, 
children in conflict with the law, exploited children, refugee children, disabled children, etc. It should be noted 
that these subgroups are not exclusive. It is possible for a child to be both disabled and on the street or on the 
street and abused, etc. This further complicates any targeting. It is therefore difficult to project a reduction of child 
poverty and vulnerability by acting exclusively on family structures as it is the case in Latin American countries. 
Interventions of this nature can only touch a group of children (living in households). A good class of children 
said Orphans and Vulnerable Children - OVC living outside a structured household will not be affected by the 
cash transfer programme even though they culminate worst poverty and vulnerability. 
 
Tackling child poverty reduction and vulnerability will be effective if it develops a balanced mix of universal (at 
the household level) and targeted services (specific groups), including outreach (social treatment on streets, career 
sites exploiting children, legal protection, etc..), and preventive measures (to combat the risk of social exclusion) 
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for children from disadvantaged situations in many ways. Can we really talk about targeting in a context where 
77% of the population lives below the poverty line? Even relying on the existing social systems, targeting in this 
context aim to strengthen the social divide and increase administrative costs and leakages. The cash transfer can 
not be selective in a post-conflict environment like DRC because it will not help riding the targeted groups. Cash 
transfer directed to U5 caregivers is already a criterion of discrimination in the allocation of subsidies. Thus, 
going for a universal programme is worthwhile as it will normally reach a theoretical maximum of 3 children per 
household, without limiting the number of children that can benefit. Also, it should be made easier for migrants and 
IDPs to enroll in the programme and draw benefits in their new areas of residence. Clearly, that requires the 
establishment of an integrated management information system for civil registration, but that is an investment that 
would be well worth making to improve the efficiency and security of the whole civil registration system, as well as to 
make it more flexible and convenient for citizens who move residence.  
 
 
5.3. Costs and potential benefits 
 
To inform decisions about those options, it is important to look at some cost comparisons, financial affordability, and 
political feasibility. The number of children estimated to qualify for the program is 12.6 million and reinforces the idea 
that this type of program is difficult to implement in a post-conflict context with widespread poverty. Giving a monthly 
direct cash transfer of US$ 15 to each child under age 5, would cost US$ 1.75 billion per year, while refining the 
transfer to US$ 10, would cost 1.52 billion per year. The total cost of the program is likely to be in the range of US$ 2.1 
billion to US$ 3.2 billion based on delivery costs which includes the cost of the transfers, the administrative costs and 
leakages. The evaluation of costs should also take into account the costs of the program in the broader context of social 
protection if the implementation is universal. Simulations based on both scenarios and calculation of costs as indicated 
in Table 2 reported that the programme is not affordable for the government because that would mean 17.7% to 25.9% 
of its real GDP in 2010 and the entire budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs (investments + current expenditures), 
while it is known that for Social affairs, current expenditure in absolute terms do not exceed 52%. 
 
Table 2:  Costing of the programme using the 2 different scenarios 
 
 Nb. of 
population 
$US 
10/month/child  
$US 
15/month/child 
Population  63226000   
Estimated number of U5 12645200   
Estimated Nb of beneficiaries per households 12645200   
Average number of U5 per households 3   
Average monthly monetary benefit per household  45 45 
Average monthly transfer  126452000 189678000 
Average Annual Transfer  1517424000 2276136000 
Average transfer as a % Poverty line*  1168416480 1752624720 
    
Pre-Transfer Household Consumption  9104544 9104544 
Administrative cost (12%) †   182090880 210314966.4 
Leakages (30%) †  455227200 682840800 
Extra-programme costs  637318080 893155766.4 
Total annual cost (incl. admin costs and leakages)  2154742080 3169291766 
    
Total as % to real GDP (2010)**  17.70% 25.90% 
Total as % to Social affairs expenditure  64.13% 94.32% 
* National poverty line actually rank at US$ 0.72 per person per day 
** 2010 real GDP as per national MTEF 
† As percentage of the delivery cost 
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5.4. Discussions 
 
Given the challenges, it is not surprising that children’s health outcomes may instead be driven by the equal 
distribution of quality services through outreach health and nutrition programmes (20% to real GDP) than a 
conditional cash transfer (25.9% to real GDP) assuming that all alternatives lead to the same benefits in term of 
life quality gained. This raises the following question: is a large-scale cash transfer programme financially and 
administratively affordable and feasible in DRC given its actual socio-economic and political situation? While 
both supply and demand side factors are likely to be important, without up front analysis, it is difficult to 
determine which policy or what combination of policies is most cost-effective for DRC government investment 
without a descriptive and bivariate analysis on expected outcomes.  
 
The estimated annual requirements to develop and support health services as planned in the MTEF are in the 
range of US$ 430 million in the period 2008-2010, around US$ 6.50 per capita annually, a level of public 
spending on health care that would be consistent with countries with an annual GDP per capita of around US$ 
200. The achievement of health-related MDGs therefore suggests an exponential increase in resource levels and  
requires annual public spending of US$ 16 to US$ 22 per capita, rising to US$ 30 to US$  40.  By this standard, 
current estimated total domestic and international public spending of around US$ 5 to US$ 6 in DRC implies a 
minimum annual gap of US$ 10 per capita, or US$ 600 million additional required resources. 
 
The deterioration of the macroeconomic balances and the dollarization of the economy are seriously jeopardizing 
the ability of the government to use the traditional monetary instruments, translating any domestic borrowing 
immediately to inflation and exchange rate depreciation. Precariously low official reserves (equivalent of only 4 
weeks of non aid-related imports at end-2007) also meant that the authorities had little margin of maneuver to 
ensure high and shared growth and create fiscal space for carrying out poverty-fighting programs. Potential 
availability of funding is therefore not enough to ensure the successful introduction of cash transfers as a national 
programme. This also requires a favorable political and social climate, with proponents who will advocate for the 
necessary share of the budget. Beside, at the institutional level, there are many ingredients to achieve these 
objectives: improved fiduciary control over revenue collection and public expenditures, decentralization, reforms 
to create professional and accountable civil service, transparent natural resource management, to mention a few. 
 
The successful experiences of cash transfers as a policy option in Latin America, Asia or in some Eastern African 
countries have taken into account the ramifications and issues at the policy making level. This one advocates for a 
political solution with key players such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning, where the 
financial implications of the program should be sufficiently analyzed before opting for the programme or its 
alternatives. The establishment of such mechanism also requires a rather impressive logistics and engineering to 
render the system transparent and fair, this is what is still lacking in the ability of government to efficiently 
implement at a reasonable scale.  
 
A number of health policies have focused on access to care for the poor with a central question: “how to increase 
demand of care for the poor?” There is an existing UNICEF, World Bank, WHO, initiative on maternal, new born 
and young child health, and DRC was selected to be one of the pilot countries at the beginning of 2006.  The 
remaining question is how to identify the core minimum package which could be offered free of charge for under 
5 children and pregnant women within that initiative?  The partnership is also trying to produce a health financing 
strategy with an emphasis on improving the levels and management of public financing.  It seeks to improve 
national government and donor financing rather than user fees (50.43% to real GDP).  
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Table 3:  Policies alternatives and costs 
 
Policies alternatives Estimated total 
cost 
(billion US$) 
% to real GDP 
(2010)  
Health-oriented universal cash transfer programme 3.17 25.90% 
Outreach health and nutrition programme* 2.51** 20% 
Elimination of basic health care user fees 6.33 50.43% 
* The distribution of nutritional supplements is now integrated with Vit A and deworming 
** From the Health Sector MTEF, and does not take into account leakages (normally low) 
 
More work on estimating the cost of implementing the DRC health sector development strategy is needed. The 
health sector development strategy adopted in 2006 intends to phase support geographically, aiming at extending 
progressively the geographic coverage of a comprehensive package of services. Thus, the financial requirements 
to implement this strategy will depend on how geographic expansion targeting is defined.  First, the package of 
health services to be supported requires costing.  Second, realistic projections of expansion of the coverage of this 
package are needed.  Further work on the MTEF will need to reflect such analysis at the same time as remaining 
realistic in terms of both the likely available resource envelope and absorption capacity.  
 
User fees and drug costs raise significant barriers to access to care for the poor, and one of the aims of domestic 
and international public financing is to substitute for the current level of out-of-pocket payments in order to 
improve access for the poor. The 2007 target is already inoperative, as the health allocation in the 2007 budget 
represents 5.7% of the total (excluding debt payments). Given the budget execution record described previously, 
even this level of spending is unlikely to be achieved.  If these targets were met (and assuming that total 
government expenditures are around 20% of GDP, which is consistent with recent years), then government health 
spending would be US$ 150 million in the first year, US$ 275 million in the second, and US$ 325 million in the 
third.   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Although the cash transfer and elimination of user fees are being debated, available resources would not allow 
public provision of basic health services free-of-charge to the entire population, even targeting the U5. Evidence 
of the severe impact on access to health services by poor populations in DRC during the conflict led to calls for 
elimination of user fees (MSF, 2001) and cash transfer conducive to human capital accumulation.  Currently, the 
issue has been raised in the context of development programs.  In any case, the paucity of available resources 
makes this debate somewhat moot: currently, it is neither possible to provide the basic package of health services 
free-of-charge to the entire population, nor is it to provide cash to households in such a post conflicts situation 
where the Country is struggling to stabilize its economy.  Reducing financial barriers to utilization and the burden 
on households will require some combination of exemption policies and the provision of free or highly-subsidized 
selected high-impact services.  Such strategies are, to some extent, already in place in DRC and they require 
strengthening in combination with the necessary external subsidies. This leads to the following conclusive 
remarks: (i) conditional cash transfer cannot operate in areas like DRC with supply-side constraints without a 
comprehensive health supply strategy, logistics and engineering to lower leakages administrative costs; (ii) In a 
context of generalized poverty (headcount = 77%), targeting is time consuming and irrelevant; (iii) The outcomes 
of a geographic focused cash transfer programme could be expected on improvement of nutritional status, but less 
on the rise for health demand and would be difficult to scale-up.  
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